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Preface
Levy Institute scholars have recently published many articles that outline
the imbalances in the U.S.economy, analyze the instability in the financial
markets, and conclude that a prolonged crisis is imminent in the absence of
adequate policy interventions.This brief by Pedro Nicolaci da Costa contin-
ues the discourse by focusing on the actions of the Federal Reserve during
assetbubbles.Hefindsthatcentralbankerswhoacceptself-policingasabasis
for sound regulation are setting the global economy up for a real disaster.
The author notes that the“Big Banks”only react when asset bubbles
burst, thereby creating a self-perpetuating cycle of perverse incentives and
moral hazard that gives rise to subsequent bubbles. Contrary to the Fed’s
current premise that policymakers cannot and should not target asset bub-
bles,recentexperiencehasbolsteredtheviewthatassetpricesmustbecome
part of the central bank’s purview in order to stabilize the economy. The
prevailing belief that bubbles are impossible to spot ahead of time is untrue,
because the housing market crash has been a train wreck in slow motion.
There was plenty the Fed could have done to discourage speculative behavior
andstoppredatorylending.Furthermore,attitudechangesamongregulators
aremoreimportantthanshiftsinmandateinensuringthatregulatorybodies
like the Federal Reserve do their job properly.
Rather than talking down the frothy housing and mortgage bond sec-
tors, the Fed failed to employ its most effective policy tool: the power of
persuasion. Under Alan Greenspan’s leadership, it embraced fads like the
“new economy”and“financial innovation”(e.g.,securitization) that were
littlemorethaneuphemismsforovervaluedstockandhomeprices.TheFed’s
mostegregiousfailuresasaregulatorybodywereitswillingnesstoembrace
these fads, its approval of a runaway process of credit creation, and its
enabling of excess risk taking and fraud in the mortgage market.As a result,
Greenspan presided over the most reckless debt binge in history.6 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
The housing and credit crisis forced the Fed to slash interest rates and
pump vast sums of liquidity into the financial system—measures that led to
speculative excesses in the commodities markets. Thus, the greatest expan-
sionof creditinmodern historywasultimately regressive,because ittrapped
its poorest and most fragile recipients in a vicious cycle of personal indebt-
edness that could take decades to unwind.The Fed’s willingness to feed the
borrowing frenzy ultimately deprived some of the world’s vulnerable pop-
ulations of basic resources as a result of subsequent price hikes in the cost of
nondiscretionary goods like food and fuel. (The food riots of the past year
have revealed the dark underbelly of global interconnectedness.) Inflating
andreflatingassetbubblesisnowaytorunastableeconomyinthelongterm.
The sheer magnitude of the housing and debt crisis offers a unique
opportunity for the Fed to reconsider its view that bubbles remain outside
its policy mandate.The problem requires proactive solutions by a federal
government that recognizes the need for greater regulatory scrutiny in spite
of a pervasive ideological aversion to regulation. Evidence suggests that reg-
ulation often enhances business confidence because it provides a set of
ground rules that are determined with broader social interests in mind.
Improvedregulatoryoversightwouldenhancepolicymakers’abilitytofend
off financial instability before it reaches crisis levels and threatens to engulf
the entire (global) system.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
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Happier Days
Human nature and political pressure make it difficult for central banks to
put the brakes on economic activity when the going is good.But in the end,
aburstingassetbubbleinevitablyrequirescentralbankaction,usuallywhen
it is already too late and with adverse spillover effects. In this sense, the
FederalReserve(Fed)andothercentralbanksalreadytargetassetprices.Yet,
by taking aim at them only on the way down, the“Big Banks”create a self-
perpetuating cycle of perverse incentives and moral hazard that often gives
rise to yet another round of bubbles.
The housing market crash has been a train wreck in slow motion.
Predictions of an eventual day of reckoning were widespread,and the warn-
ing signals were ubiquitous: price charts showing home values rising impos-
sibly into the stratosphere; the growing practice of second and third home
purchases as investment properties; late-night infomercials professing a
million easy ways to make millions in real estate; andWall Street’s increasing
reliance on housing-backed bonds for its record-setting profits.
To be sure, bubbles are best perceived with the benefit of hindsight, a
point that Fed policymakers have continually stressed (Kohn 2006). But the
housing story has rendered untenable the prevailing belief that they are
impossible to spot ahead of time. A predictable crisis is a preventable one,
and it has become abundantly clear that there was plenty the Fed could have
donetodiscouragespeculativebehaviorandputastop topredatory lending.
Whilesuchanapproachislargelydiscouragedinbothconventionalwis-
dom and the prevailing academic literature,recent U.S.experience has bol-
stered the view that asset prices must enter the central bank’s purview in
order for the economy to retain some semblance of stability. Former Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker (2008) recently called for a broader regulatory role
for the central bank in light of the housing-centered credit crisis.
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Indeed, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s latest plan for tackling the
crisis involves giving the Fed vast new authority to regulate investment
banks, not just depository institutions. However, this paper will argue that
attitude changes among regulators will be even more important than shifts
in mandate in ensuring that regulators like the Fed do their jobs properly.
The U.S. central bank’s current premise is that policymakers cannot
and should not target asset bubbles. They are unable to do so, it is argued,
because bubbles are impossible to spot until it is too late. They should not
do so because taking action, particularly through tighter monetary policy,
could unnecessarily derail healthy sectors of the economy.
“After more than a half-century observing numerous price bubbles
evolve and deflate,I have reluctantly concluded that bubbles cannot be safely
defused by monetary policy or other policy initiatives before the speculative
fever breaks on its own,”Alan Greenspan (2007) wrote in an editorial piece
published in the Wall Street Journal.
This line of thinking, often regurgitated by sitting Fed officials, is shaky
on both counts.Asset bubbles have become increasingly obvious.Greenspan
himself spottedthestockbubblewellinadvanceof itspeak,famouslyaccus-
ing the markets of irrational exuberance in 1996. Later, though, he whole-
heartedly embraced the fad of a “new economy” and talk of an American
“productivity miracle.”
The housing bubble was even easier to spot, and was widely predicted
by a number of analysts—though these observers were often typecast as
downbeat doomsayers in an otherwise rosy financial universe (Schenker
2004,Schiff 2005).Notthatittookveryscrutinousanalysistofigureoutwhat
was happening. The barrage of late-night get-rich-quick housing schemes
ontelevision,aswellasanumberof regularprogramsdevotedtoeverything
fromhomeimprovementtotheactualactof“flipping”houses,offeredplenty
of pointers to even the unskilled eye.
Innovation, Exploitation
Nowhere is the very real human impact of the sort of reckless lending prac-
tices that can arise at the hands of an excessively laissez-faire central bank
more evident than in the United States. Here, it is important to keep in
mind the other side of the lending ledger—the borrower. Not only wereThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 9
dubious lending habits mislabeled by lenders as “innovation” that would
improve access to credit for the underclass, but the Federal Reserve also
fully bought into this line, with disastrous consequences. This gave business
sectors as shady as used car sales the stamp of officialdom that prevented a
broader questioning of potential hazards, including what might happen
when variable-interest-rate loans reset at new and increasingly unaffordable
heights.
There is a fine line between ranking credit risks and exploiting the poor.
Inastrictlyhands-off regulatorysystem,theformerinevitablymorphsinto
thelatter.ThisiswhathashappenedintheUnitedStates.Thegreatestexpan-
sionof creditinmodern historywasultimately regressive,because ittrapped
its poorest and most fragile recipients in a vicious cycle of personal indebt-
edness that will take years,if not decades,to unwind.Consumer credit out-
standing, currently at $2.5 trillion,now represents nearly one-fifth of gross
domestic product.This is a problem that will not go away of its own accord,
and requires proactive solutions by an engaged federal government.
The Fallacy of Affordability
The greatest misconception surrounding the emergence of the subprime
mortgage sector, widely accepted by policymakers and politicians alike, is
that it was a natural extension of the dream of American ownership, a way
to make credit more broadly available to those with lower incomes and
shakier credit histories. The reality was very different. What subprime loans
did, in retrospect, was make housing less affordable by artificially inflating
home prices in many parts of the country, thereby putting a home out of
reach for many poor and middle-classAmericans.And for those households
thatdidmanagetosecure amortgage,thepricing andinterest ratestructure
was ultimately prohibitive,a fact all too apparent now that U.S.foreclosures
have reached crisis levels.
WhatisstrikingfromapolicystandpointisthattheFednotonlystood
idly by as many experts argued that both the housing and securitization
booms had gotten out of hand, but it also actively encouraged speculation
by touting the advent of real estate derivatives as a milestone in “financial
innovation.”Ironically,this overwhelming nod of approval was taking place
evenasFedChairmanBenBernanke(2007)admittedthatthesecuritization10 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
process was diminishing the central bank’s ability to influence the housing
sector through interest rate policy.
In this context, it is important to ask whether giving the Fed increased
regulatory authority over banks,as Secretary Paulson has proposed,will be
enough to ensure that the grossly inadequate lending practices that came to
pass in the housing sector do not return in a new form once the economy
recovers from recession. A change of heart, it seems, is perhaps even more
crucial to the efficacy of any regulatory regime than an express mandate.
Indeed,the Fed already had broad oversight over much of the banking
sector and yet failed to exercise it, in large part because of an ideological
aversion to government’s meddling in the business of financial markets.But
it was this very scepticism of regulation that laid the groundwork for much
of the chaos that has ensued, both in housing and in banking (da Costa
2008c, Mayer 2008).
Inorderforanysystemtoworkproperly,therefore,currentFedofficials
andtheir eventual successors must become convinced of the needfor greater
regulatory scrutiny.The housing debacle should go some way toward easing
their aversion to a more hands-on approach.
What Bubble?
Following Greenspan’s lead, Fed officials have adamantly argued that the
central bank cannot and should not target asset bubbles.The central prem-
ise of this argument is that bubbles are impossible to spot until it’s too late,
and that preemptive action aimed at one particular sector—say, the hous-
ing or equity markets—unnecessarily risks derailing the broader economy.
Yet the great American housing crash suggests this line of reasoning is spe-
cious at best.
In reality,Greenspan knew the U.S.stock market was heading for trou-
ble during the 1990s,and very early on in fact.In housing,too,policymakers
looked the other way despite ample evidence of excesses,including unprece-
dented price growth.
America’s housing collapse casts serious doubt on the idea that asset
bubbles are too elusive for policymakers to spot them in time.A number
of economists and financial experts had long predicted that America’s
excess reliance on debt would end badly, and, in particular, that residentialThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
construction and home prices appeared to have reached unsustainable levels
(Schenker 2004, Schiff 2005). To be sure, this view did not infiltrate either
the Wall Street consensus or the Federal Reserve’s inner policy circle. But
the warning signs were plenty.Loan-to-value ratios were going through the
roof. Global perceptions of risk, as evidenced by credit spreads, had fallen
to all-time lows. Home prices in coastal areas and states like Arizona and
Nevada had doubled, even tripled, in the span of just a few years.
This brings us to the other major point of contention regarding the
inclusionof assetpricesinthepolicycalculus.Raisinginterestratesintheface
of a sector-specific boom could impact negatively on healthy expansions in
otherareas,potentiallycompromisingeconomicgrowth.Thisisnotanunim-
portant concern for Fed officials, particularly since their policy goals, unlike
those of some of their overseas counterparts, include both low inflation and
maximum sustainable employment. This dual mandate makes U.S. central
bankofficialsespeciallycautiousaboutcompromisinganexpansionarytrend.
Yet the call for policymakers to begin paying closer attention to asset
price bubbles should not be interpreted as a vote for concrete asset price
targets.This has never been suggested with any seriousness.Any attempt to
aim at, say, some ideal level in the Dow Jones industrial average or a partic-
ular median home price would likely prove not only cumbersome but also
futile, and would surely have destabilizing macroeconomic repercussions.
Instead, improved regulatory oversight would enhance policymakers’
abilitytofendoff financialinstabilitybeforeitreachescrisislevelsandthreat-
ens to engulf the entire system. Globally, a growing number of central
bankers—includingthoseinEngland,Norway,Canada,andNewZealand—
havealsosupported“leaningagainst”bubblesbygentlytappingonthemon-
etary brakes when signs of trouble begin to appear (Cardarelli, Igan, and
Rebucci 2008).
American Mavericks
In this sense, U.S. policymakers have become increasingly isolated in their
call for unequivocally rejecting asset prices as a driver of policy. This has
been true despite the fact that their own economy offers perhaps the best
case study for why bubbles should remain in the crosshairs of monetary
officials if the transmission mechanism is to remain effective.12 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
Home ownership rates in industrialized countries have risen sharply over
the past three decades, boosting household wealth and enhancing purchas-
ing power for many citizens.Until recently,the United States was the quin-
tessential success story in this area, with the equity from rapidly rising
homevaluesliningthepocketsof millionsof middle-classfamiliesandunder-
pinning the greatest uninterrupted spending boom in more than 50 years.
But recent developments have highlighted the dark side of this vaunted
American dream.As the booming real estate business drove lenders to make
increasingly risky loans, the excess supply of residential construction satu-
rated the already lofty market.The popping of this bubble has given way to
the most severe housing downturn in decades.
The housing sector is inextricably linked to debt. Mortgages are by far
the largest loans taken on by families and individuals, and their invention
has made ownership possible for millions who otherwise would have been
unable to afford them.Yet,as in any market taken to its logical extreme,the
desire to squeeze every last ounce of profit out of America’s home-buying
bonanzahasendedintears.Thoseactuallycryingarethefamilieswhowere
swindled into loans they could not afford,with deceptive and intentionally
confusingpricingstrategiesfraughtwithhiddenfeesandunforeseenexpenses.
The banking sector, too, is smarting from its own gluttony, feeling the
pinch from the mortgage mess in the form of multibillion-dollar losses.
Naturally, those losing billions are still left with millions, so their troubles
can hardly be stacked against the plight of a family facing imminent fore-
closure on their home. Nonetheless, the impact of the housing slump on
financial institutions is likely to have profound implications for economic
growth in coming years, if not decades. With the tacit consent of regula-
tors, lending became so irresponsible that prudent borrowing has also
been threatened, with wide-ranging repercussions for both consumers and
businesses.
Under Greenspan’s leadership,the Federal Reserve quietly abandoned
itsmandateasadetachedeconomicarbiterandtookonmoreof acheerlead-
ing role, embracing fads like the “new economy” and “financial innovation”
that later turned out to be little more than euphemisms for overvalued stock
and home prices.
Even as the housing bubble neared its apex,Greenspan (2005) played
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ruleouthomepricedeclines,especiallyinsomelocalmarkets,thesedeclines,
were they to occur, likely would not have substantial macroeconomic impli-
cations,” Greenspan told Congress. “Nationwide banking and widespread
securitization of mortgages make it less likely that financial intermediation
would be impaired than was the case in prior episodes of regional house
price corrections.”
The Fed also failed to raise any red flags regarding the reactive nature
of credit rating agencies, an especially flagrant omission given their proven
inability to spot earlier crises likeArgentina’s bond default.It was the back-
ing of the rating agencies that allowed for the broad spreading of subprime
securities, since triple-A ratings were seen as basis enough for inclusion of
real-estate securities in safety-seeking, conservative portfolios.
During his 18-year tenure, Greenspan’s ultimate fear was that he would
be seen as the party-spoiler.Ironically,this very reticence has earned the for-
mer Fed chairman his place in modern economic history as the man who
presided over the most reckless debt binge in history.
Words: Mightier Than Rates
Not only did the Fed not flex its regulatory muscle in anticipation of the
subprime mess,but it also failed to employ what is arguably its most effective
policy tool: the power of persuasion. Rather than talking down the frothy
housing and mortgage bond sectors, the Fed touted them as beacons of
cutting-edgefinancialprogress,toolsthatsuccessfullyallowedforthespread-
ing of risk, thereby raising the amount of capital available for investment.
Never mind that the concept of spreading risk would likely have sounded
both impetuous and imprudent to a medical doctor.
TheFed’sownwordsmightindeedhaveprovenmightierthanitsmore
tangible policy tools,if only they had been employed soon enough.By mak-
ing clear that it was honing in on housing as a potential arena for trouble,
a more vocal Fed would have had an immediate dampening effect on the
market, effectively preempting any need for emergency measures—and,
potentially,even the emergency itself.Such a policy focus might have come
about in the form of a working group task force, comprising actors from
government, industry, and academia. By airing out differing views in such
a manner, the central bank would have sent a clear signal to those involved14 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
in the mortgage arena that egregious acts of deception and fraud would be
highly scrutinized, and not the least bit tolerated.
Such steps might also have gone some way toward bringing to light the
dubious practices that have since been unmasked: loans made with little or
no proof of income; the steering of minorities into variable-rate loans, even
those families who could have qualified for fixed-rate mortgages (Gershberg
2008); purely speculative purchases of investment properties for which the
cost of foreclosure was lower than that of holding the loan to maturity;and
the outright falsification of documents,sanctioned by the very commercial
banks that the Fed was supposed to be regulating (da Costa 2008b).
One of the Fed’s most egregious failures as a regulatory body—and
ultimately as a law enforcement agency—was its willingness to embrace new
fads in the financial sector without scrutiny or independent analysis.In the
latest crisis, asset securitization was welcomed as an unequivocal good.
Policymakers paid little or no attention to its possible downside risks. In
fact, the central bank repeatedly stated that the ability to securitize things
like mortgages and car loans, by“spreading risk,”would ultimately prevent
the emergence of a crisis.
The Fed had no business touting securitization—its job,in fact,was to
besuspiciousof newfangledfinancialproductsthatevenWallStreetinvestors
themselves had a difficult time explaining. In doing so, the central bank
gave a runaway process of credit creation its unequivocal approval,becom-
ing a de facto enabler of excess risk taking and, in many instances, fraud
(Black 2008).
Self-Imposed Limitations
One of the Fed’s primary arguments as to why it was unable to stem the
boom-bust of housing is that so much of the business of lending was now
taking place outside of its traditional realm of scrutiny. In the so-called
“shadow banking system,”enormous capital flows were now emerging from
investment banks and hedge funds,neither of which policymakers had any
legal control over.
However, this argument is difficult to accept, if for no other reason
than the Fed never lamented this lack of regulatory authority until after the
crisis was already well under way (Geithner 2008). Had it done so, suchThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
explicit attention might again have acted as a moderate drag on a sector that
looked to be getting out of hand—just the sort of low-impact approach,
incidentally, that policymakers have suggested they favor.
“The Fed, after all, had broad powers to supervise commercial banks,
andmanyof themstillhaddeeptroublewithsubprimeandattendantwrite-
offs,”writes Milton Ezrati (2008), a senior economist and market strategist
at money management firm Lord Abbett. Even recognizing this, Ezrati’s
research reflectsAmerica’s phobia of regulation:“The danger,as in past reg-
ulatory frenzies, is that the regulators go too far, the way they did with
Sarbanes-Oxley, or worse still, that they will try to turn back the clock on
the financial innovations of past years.”
The Rising Toll of Bubble Madness
The U.S.-led cycle of bubbles, whose global impact has been increasing
over the past two decades,seems far from over.Events that most investment
modelspredictedshouldonlyhappeneveryhundredyearsseemtobeoccur-
ring at least once a decade, and the intervals between them appear to be
narrowing.
The housing and credit crises have forced the Fed not only to slash
interest rates sharply,but also to pump vast sums of liquidity—in excess of
half a trillion dollars—into the financial system.This is of course an appro-
priateresponseif,inthejudgmentof policymakers,itmightpreventbroader
economic dislocations like a prolonged recession.
However, there is ample evidence that these measures are already lead-
ing to speculative excesses elsewhere. This time, though, rather than lifting
themiddleclassintheUnitedStatesandothernations,astheascentof hous-
ing prices did,the latest boom is taking place in an area that is likely to exact
an even greater toll on the more fragile pockets of the consumer population:
commodities.
The Fed’s actions on both rates and liquidity have exacerbated the U.S.
dollar’sprecipitousdescent.Butintheprocess,theyhavealsoliftedtheprice
of oil, gold, and other commodities to unprecedented heights. This is the
acumen of regressive central banking, because the rise in these prices has
animmediateanddiscernibleeffectonsomeof themostvulnerablesectors
of the population, in the form of spikes in the cost of nondiscretionary16 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
goods like food and fuel. “Now they are throwing a lot of liquidity out,
(but) it’s going to food and energy,” says Lakshman Achuthan, managing
director of the Economic Cycle Research Institute and member of the Levy
Institute’sBoardof Governors.“Thisnon-discretionaryconsumerspending
makes up the lion’s share of the low-income consumer’s budget.So the Fed
is trying to help out, but it’s really hurting the low-income consumer”(da
Costa 2008a).
The Next Bubble May Be Deadly
Those looking for proof that bubbles have become increasingly easy to spot
in a highly levered financial world need look no further than this year’s
spike in commodity costs. Oil prices soared to record highs approaching
$150 a barrel last month before tumbling back to earth as it became clear
that global demand would falter. Gold has raced past the $1,000 per ounce
mark. Other metals, including industrially key copper and steel, have fol-
lowed suit.
Yet the severity of these developments pales in comparison with what
was arguably the most dangerous bubble of all: food. By sheer speculation
andwithonlymoderaterelationshiptothebasiclawsof supplyanddemand,
the price of everything from wheat to soybeans skyrocketed just as the U.S.
credit crisis began, leading to food shortages and riots in several of the
world’s poorer nations.In this perverse manner,the industrial world’s glut-
tonous appetite for credit and consumption—and the Fed’s unflinching
willingness to feed the borrowing frenzy—has deprived some of the most
vulnerable populations on the planet of basic resources that were already
scarce to begin with.
In a global financial marketplace,these trends simply cannot be isolated
from the policies of the world’s top monetary authorities (Rojas-Suarez
2008). Massive cash injections totalling in the trillions of dollars, from the
Fed, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and others, visibly
funneledanewburst of liquidityintothecommodities sector,theonlyarena
seemingly untouched by the U.S. housing crisis and related credit woes.
The results proved catastrophic and, in some cases, lethal.
Food riots from the Caribbean to parts of Africa revealed the dark
underbelly of global interconnectedness. Unimaginably, food shortagesThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
extended even to the United States,with retail giant Wal-Mart announcing
in April that it was limiting sales of several types of rice (Maestri 2008).
While U.S. citizens, unlike those of Haiti or Madagascar, will probably
never face such extreme consequences as widespread food shortages as a
result of market excesses, they are in fact already paying a price, not only
because of what now looks like an inevitable recession,but also due to bud-
dinginflationpressuresthatmanyfearwillpersistoverthenexttwodecades.
Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, credited with reining in the runaway
inflation of the 1970s with then-unpopular interest rate increases, recently
argued at a Harvard Club forum in NewYork that,while the current outlook
cannotbecomparedtothe1970sasawhole,itdoesbearsomeresemblance
to the outset of that difficult decade (Volcker 2008).
Over the past month,softer economic growth in Europe and Japan has
taken the edge off commodity prices, leading to a sharp reversal in those
markets.However,evenabrief run-inwithfoodshortagesshouldbeenough
to illustrate a basic point: inflating and reflating asset bubbles is no way to
run a stable economy in the long run.
Overcoming Regulation-phobia
America’s housing crisis is emblematic of an ideological aversion to regu-
lation that has culminated in aWildWest approach to the business of lend-
ing. In this environment, the result of two decades of deregulation, all bets
were off when it came to promoting sound business and risk-management
practices. The world’s preeminent financial firms were all complicit in
engaging in highly leveraged speculation in areas that showed clear signs of
overvaluation.
The industry’s incentive structure was such that a pressure to produce
ever more massive quarterly profits became a primary guiding principle of
decision making. The insulation of upper management from any serious
potential for personal financial losses gave rise to a perverse tendency to
look the other way on dubious deals. As long as they continued to yield
short-term results, structured financial products that were packaged and
repackaged in countless forms, however opaque, were the securities du jour.
Everybodyhadtohaveapiece.Theactionsof topexecutivesbecamesodeeply
detached from the long-term interests of their respective firms,in fact,that18 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
banks continued to chase these securities even as their value plummeted,
like reckless gamblers chasing losses at a casino table (Krugman 2007).
Yet, rather than providing a compass for solid underwriting standards
andreasonablelendingpractices,theFederalReservenotonlyturnedablind
eye to increasingly shady behavior in the U.S. mortgage market but also
egged on the sector’s explosive growth, hailing securitized bonds as sym-
bols of innovation that allowed credit to become more widely accessible.
Believing in the self-correcting power of markets, Greenspan, Bernanke,
and their colleagues allowed market forces to run their unfettered course,
with disastrous consequences for the U.S. and global economies.
Just months before the credit crisis erupted, Bernanke (2007) went on
the record defending deregulation and warning against the possible toll of
enhanced rules.“How best to respond to these daunting challenges? As I
noted, there are powerful arguments against ad hoc instrument-specific
or institution-specific regulation. The better alternative is a consistent,
principles-based,and risk-focused approach that takes account of the ben-
efits as well as the risks that accompany financial innovation,”he told partic-
ipants of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank’s Financial Markets Conference.
Red Tape or Rule of Law?
Experience suggests that regulation often enhances rather than detracts
from business confidence, despite cries to the contrary from the nation’s
various chambers of commerce.Companies listing their shares on American
exchanges,for instance,are often viewed in a more positive light by prospec-
tive investors,because they are seen as being subjected to tighter regulatory
and accounting standards than their counterparts listed elsewhere.
Then there is the question of prevailing economic philosophy, which
tends to associate regulation with inefficiency and cumbersome bureaucra-
cies.Advocatesof amorestringentfinancialcodesaythisisamisguidedway
tothinkaboutthegovernment’srole.Afterall,itistheruleof lawthatlends
the financial system the legitimacy that gives investors enough comfort to
take risks.Regulation hawks argue that having a basic framework for proper
behavior is just the sort of confidence-booster that current market condi-
tions sorely lack. The widespread consensus that generally advocates mini-
mal or“light touch”regulation will not be overturned overnight.But at theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
very least,the scope of recent troubles and the prospect of an even deeper
slump could nudge the Fed toward a more hands-on approach.
Regulationdoesnotjustmeanredtape.Itmeansabidingbybasicrules
of conduct that actually enhance the business of finance by surrounding it
with a sense of confidence and stability—just what it sorely lacks under
current conditions.In modern economics,regulation is essentially frowned
upon as a superfluous business cost and an obstacle to open trade. But the
rule of law should not be equated with red tape. Regulation simply provides
a set of ground rules for business, rules determined with broader social
interests in mind.In reality,a basic framework for proper behavior endows
businesses like finance with a sense of legitimacy and stability—just what
is sorely lacking under current conditions.
Uncentral Bank: The Implications of Eroding Confidence
The Fed has greatly diluted its own relevance by embracing the role of
financial cheerleader. Repeatedly, it has proven behind the curve in both
spotting and reacting to asset crises, and has been forced to scramble with
rapid rate cuts,contributing to uncertainty and exacerbating market volatil-
ity. By warming up to the notion that asset bubbles pose an a priori danger
to economic and financial stability, the Fed would go some way toward
reversing the lack of confidence in its ability to stabilize the U.S. economy.
This is crucially important,since a weaker Fed could lead to a reinforcement
of market excesses that are now pushing the global economy into recession.
The sheer magnitude of the current housing and debt crises offers a
unique opportunity for the Fed to reconsider its long-held view that bub-
bles should remain outside the policy radar. Minneapolis Federal Reserve
Bank President Gary Stern (2008) indicated his own willingness to do so in
a recent speech at the European Economics and Financial Centre in
London.“While I have not yet changed my opinion that asset-price levels
should not be an objective of monetary policy, I am reviewing this conclu-
sion in the wake of the fallout from the decline in house prices and from
the earlier collapse of prices of technology stocks.”
Withbanklossestotallingover$200billion,atallythattheInternational
Monetary Fund has estimated may quintuple when all is said and done,
and the economy facing the possibility of an unusually severe recession20 Public Policy Brief, No. 95
(Krasny 2008), the time has indeed become ripe for a revaluation of the
central bank’s approach.
Cardarelli, Igan, and Rebbucci (2008) have found that, for countries
withmoreintricatemortgagesystemswherecomplexfinancialchannelscan
have a broader macroeconomic impact, it may be wise for policymakers to
respond more aggressively to national housing trends.In their study of sev-
eral major economies, the authors discovered that“innovations in housing
finance systems have increased the scale of spillovers from the housing sec-
tor to the general economy and that housing seems to be particularly impor-
tant in the monetary transmission mechanism in countries with more
developed mortgage markets.”
Beyond the realm of monetary policy, the need for better regulatory
tools employed in conjunction with a vigilant monetary mechanism have
found growing acceptance in both scholarly and policy circles (Borio and
White2004).Bernanke(2008)himself hascalledforanoverhaulof thecoun-
try’s fragmented regulatory structure in recent congressional testimony.
Jane D’Arista (2008) recommends the creation of a new reserve man-
agement system that gauges reserves against assets rather than deposits,
thereby acting as a more targeted brake on credit than traditional monetary
policy.This seems like a reasonable approach,although its repercussions lie
outside the scope of this paper.
Whatever the specifics of day-to-day monetary operations, prudent
policies will only come from policymakers who have honed their regulatory
antennas in such a way as to both spot asset bubbles and address them.
In a global economy where constant growth is viewed as an unequivocal
good, this may be a difficult approach to implement. But as the U.S. hous-
ing and financial crises so clearly indicate, central bankers who accept self-
policing as a basis for sound regulation are setting the global economy up
for a real disaster.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
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